The bloody Yemeni box doesn't encourage the follow up and buying tickets, especially for the western crowd unless al-Qaeda and one of its affiliates are the actors. Apart from that the situation in Yemen will be left as it is, and there will be content with analgesics for the revolution, and leave everything as it is, in addition to holding tribal alliances to guarantee minimum stability that will not contribute to forming a new Yemen that is desired by all, especially those who are more cohesive, influenced and impressed by Yemen, from the gulf countries, foremost of them Saudi Arabia.
Yemen is not living a transitional stage though the apparent departure of President Saleh is sign to that. Even his snakes which are observed by all on grounds that it is behind all that is happening, have no such power. The deep split over the army restructure before the economic assistance returns us to a traditional question that happened in Afghanistan and Iraq before that, and now it is repeated in Yemen. Giving priority in the American style of putting expediency before principle in terms of giving priority to security and neglecting economic development, means creating an atmosphere for cloning a regime similar to the previous one and produce a new Karazai, which doesn't work in the context of a new complex Yemen. It will only add to complicating the country's crisis and changes it into a small country granted to the influential.
 Attention is directed towards the new al-Qaeda in the south, which is not a virtual state on the internet. It is existing with its areas, orientation media and even with their political negotiations with the tribe. The situation goes beyond playing with fire by the former regime, however it goes beyond playing the role of the juggler who dances with the snakes through his pipe which doesn't meam the complete control over them.
Encouragement of self governance in the south and the Houthis areas means the disintegration of the remaining symbolic unity as well as encouraging other small states that come from beyond the history desiring to swallow up part of the chaos cake, which Yemen seems to be standing on its brink.
Investment in human beings is the important step in Yemen now, through the introducing the carrot before the stick, so as to preserve the thin thread of unity which the Yemenis speak about it without exerting political dues for gaining its benefits.
The attempts of jumping over the performance of President Hadi, or pressurizing him to accept security arrangements and scheduling the restructure of the state's institutions is in other words offering more time for the eruption of new small regional revolutions.
Many areas used to be rising up against the central Sana'a authority became now more independent and are being disputed among three forces that control the scene including al-Qaeda which is adept in gorilla war and having its military dominance. There are also the tribes which possess an arsenal of weapons but with ability to negotiate with all, and the Houthis who are the most capable of forming a state that is more intact and can desist from Hezbollah experience. They are still reluctant between loyalty to Iran and the desire to enter into dialogue for power sharing.
The separatists in the south are a disproportionate mixture, threatening of the break out of civil wars between the separatists who dream of a past state (al-Qaeda), and the aspirations of a Caliph state, including limited numbers of helpless intellectuals and liberal elites, who are convinced that all options including clinging to unity involve great risks.
The belief in the peaceful Yemeni revolution and its purity is very true, however what is said of its guarantee against Yemeni violence is a sort of changing the revolution into a holy experience.
Al-Qaeda used to exist in its areas before the revolution and after it. It doesn't mind overthrowing the regimes on the style of; on the hands of Jack not Tom's.
This will make it safe from foreign intervention. It is also capable of exploiting the revolutionary periods in re- arranging its priorities, and this is accurately what happened in Yemen.
The reading of the experience of the independent journalists who stayed for long periods with al-Qaeda in Yemen, know the extent of the penetration of these militants into the fighting tribal groups that are supported by the tribal enthusiasm of  the Yemeni social fabric, giving it a private status similar to the Afghan situation before liberation.
It exceeds Chechnya and the Bosnian situations and later on the Iraqi model. Al-Qaeda in Yemen hopes in establishing a new Somali model, where if it is not a partner in power it will be in dispute with it through its independent position.
 The imposition of a central state after President Saleh's style had not been successful because of its power, but due to the jugular's method in training the snakes, through complex alliances including allocating huge amounts of money for obtaining the confidence of all.
The model of a reconciliation state also seems hard to achieve in Yemen, because it requires a minimum limit of a civil political vision even if through religious slogans. These slogans will be a great crisis if we take into account the growing power of the Houthis. It will be hard to return them into the state's power, the more stronger their influence of self-government becomes.
The real Yemeni crisis is the continuation of the relations regulating the authorities between the tribes and the weak central government, through negotiations, alliance and dispute with mutinous authorities that contain groups of harmonious militias under one banner. They are mostly groups that have a legacy of common experience in the Afghan Jihad and the periods that followed.
The continuation of such types of relations is due to the strength of the authority, and the protection which is provided by those who are rebellious against the central authority, most importantly because of the ability of the political insurgents to secure the simple needs in the areas which are under their influence.
  Frightening the people who are threatened with hunger, poverty, lack of water, disruption of primary services is a kind of a meaningless absurd joke .
Hope lies in the Yemen friends who will shortly meet in Riyadh . It is true that the accumulating problems of decades of centralization and administrative corruption cannot be easily resolved, however the rescheduling of assistance and distributing it in a just regional manner without passing through previous corruption channels, will contribute to blocking the way in front of the "political dissidents" so as to save Yemen the outbreak of a counter revolution.
The integration of the Yemeni political components is the solution. Dissolving the Yemeni tribe is a sort of an imaginary thought, however these components can be linked to Sana'a through a series of political and economic motivations as well as the gradual integration of the tribal elements into the Yemeni army so as to be a solid wall in front of the growing power of al-Qaeda.
The situation is very tense in Yemen and this is not pessimism, however there are many dreadful information about the influx of Somali militants from the Yemeni borders so as to be stationed in the south. The Iranian money also flows to the Houthis, enabling them to buy the loyalty of organizations and groups of the Yemeni political elites, who want to revenge Saleh regime through thwarting the GCC initiative and its aftermath. Between this and that there is sharp retreat in living standards of the Yemeni people which arises concern.