The problem of the regime is that it has mastered the cheating and dodger game to the extent that made it to lose confidence of all internal and external forces.
This has been experienced in its dialogue with the JMP before and during the revolution, and has introduced itself to the international community as a master in tricking others and postponing crises.
When the regime signed the initiative, a great question aroused as to whether it will fulfill its commitments, because many thought that the breach of the initiative remains to be possible by the regime, who didn't believe in it. it was only forced on it by internal situations (youth revolution,) regional pressure (the gulf countries,) and an international forces ( UN Security Council.)
The regime has no alternative other than depending on stirring up chaos, messing up security and stability, working for thwarting the National Reconciliation government, and to make the acting Vice President look as not being able to proceed with the implementation of the initiative.
This is what the regime works on as it is the case in Taiz, which is suffering from a suffocating siege and war on its people.
It seems to be thinking of how to evade its commitments because it has wrongly anticipated that it can leave behind the situation and can remain in its power square, not knowing that it is committing a folly that it had not well calculated its aftermath, as most of the human rights' reports are condemning the regime, and no other one other than the regime will be held accountable for the failures.
It should be smart enough for the regime as to implement the initiative's provisions, by meeting its commitments so that it would avoid the accountability which is about to strangle it.
This could be realized in light of the files that had been submitted to the international Criminal Court, accusing the regime of violating freedoms to the extent that amounted to being crimes against humanity.
It has to seek conciliation with the people instead of the ventures that had never been in its favor, but on the contrary they had cost it political and moral loses.
The regime should known very well that it is incriminated before the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and therefore should work for curing the great faults that it had caused.
The regime should not lead the matters to a deadlock with the JMP, because the JMP would not accept that the initiative would be thwarted or to be without results in reality.
They would not risk destroying their good relations with the change squares, or to be a protective shield for the regime in its disavowing to the initiative.
If the JMP resigns from the government, in case that the conditions of success become not favorable, that would be a great and fatal blow to the regime that it may never be able to survive it.
It will be held responsible for this great failure, and the question of the alternative would be put into effect through a popular decision, that will find an entire support by the UN.
Credibility is the real attitude that the regime needs to deal with in the current circumstances, as well as refraining from practices of violence, killing and terror, and to seek a partnership relation that makes it come out with the least loses possible.
That would be a clever step, following its failure to deal with the youth's revolution, and to meet their demands after the regime had admitted the injustice done to them and their just demands.
These confessions have as usual remained to be mere words in the air released by the regime in dealing with others. This made things reach the level of demanding the departure of the regime and to demand its trial together with all its system. This no doubt would be inevitable in case the regime continued its attempts of aborting the initiative , which is basically a major achievement for it in the first place, because it provided guarantees to it, that had never been given before to any other Arab leader. It had to seek to back up these guarantees, and to fully respect the provisions of the initiative.
This is the ideal way for the regime if it weighed things in a rational manner away from snobbery, so as to coexist with the things at hand and to exploit the convenient circumstances for a peaceful departure instead of a dishonorable one.
It is to be note that any miscalculated dealing by the regime, would be a political suicide, before it understands the extent of the loses that it would find itself to have encountered due to indiscretion and If the regime adopted violence as a means for dealing with the just demands. Violence would never set matters back to their right track, and the revolutionaries in the change squares will never go home, after the bloodshed they experienced, the hundred martyrs and the thousand wounded that fell.
This requires that the regime should understand and stop listening to the opportunist forces that had made him lose the local, regional and international confidence, because losing confidence is a great plight into which the regime fell , causing it to be abandoned by all as well as being condemned for every flounder or failure that happens.
It should be, aware of the painful fate it might face in the coming days, if it continues to behave in accordance with fantasies and obsessions, and not according to the fact that it is no longer able to stay in power.
It has only two options to consider, either a revolution that would topple it and hence lose everything or work for the success of the initiative and create the circumstances that accomplish it as required.
The regime has to choose, the assurance of the guarantees, with the peaceful withdrawal from the political life, which will be an assured victory to it. Which of the two options is the regime going to choose? the next days would disclose the answer to this question.