It is not easy to ignore what “David Ignatius” said in the Washington Post some days ago about Annan’s new Plan for the solution in Syria, which is still controversial until today. We say this since its features have emerged through a group of new statements and stances for the most influential parties in the Syrian crisis, at the international and regional levels. That was clear when the Russians announced that the survival of Assad in power is not a condition for the solution in Syria, then in their support to the Yemeni scenario if the Syrian people would accept it. This was faced with an Iranian silent and a change in the Chinese tone as well.
The fact is that it is useless to consider the recent positions on the crisis away from stager of the Syrian regime and the obvious failure of Annan’s plan that is being implemented on the ground, but the regime did not comply with any of its provisions. Let alone the development of the Syrian revolution towards militarization, even though it has not yet been popular, which people are still the strongest mark among its events.
The new plan concerns many affective parties in the Syrian scene. On top of these parties are Russia and China, as the plan ensured their participation in the guardianship and implementation, within an international contact group, which may preserve their interests to some extent. After this, the plan is also consistent with the concern of the strong institutions of the regime, especially the military and security ones, that will not be touched, at least in the first stage. This may drive leaders of those institutions to put pressure on Assad to accept the plan, in case he hesitated. The plan also goes in line with the concerns of the social structure of the Elway Sect (Assad’s social class), that may see this plan as a way out of a civil war. This sect would be the fuel of such war. Because the Elwy are convinced of the possibility if winning such war, not to mention the wide revenge acts that will take place if the situation remained unchanged.
All this happens in the light of the stagger of the Syrian regime, as we have referred to before, which becomes clear day by day in the widening of the rifts in the army. Add to this, the regime has lost control on wide areas of the Syrian territory, which threatens to provide a safe areas for the revolutionaries, that may be the starting point for the liberation, as has happened in Benghazi. Let alone the fall of the myth of Halab and Damascus, amid an apparent engagement of the two cities in the popular uprising, and even the armed struggle.
In the details of the new plan, we find main terms stipulating the departure of Assad to resort to Russia, amid rumors reported by the same U.S. newspaper that he has smuggled 6 billion dollar to Russia. Following this, Presidential and Parliamentarian elections to be held. In these elections, it will not be very difficult to provide a model like Ahmed Shafiq’s (the presidential candidate belonging to the deposed regime), in Syria, if the minorities- that amount quarter of the population- agreed on him along with the support from the military and security institutions. This is also possible amid the fragmentation of the opposition forces, which is difficult for them to agree on a consensus candidate.
But the poor talk of the plan about reforms to the security institution, similar to what happened in Eastern Europe, these talks could be avoided in a way or another during the next stage. This plan will result in a process to save the Syrian regime, as happened with the Yemeni one. A major difference between Yemen and Syria could be considered here, which is the security structure of Yemen and the sectarian in Syria, despite that relatives of Saleh control the army or some joints in the security institution.
What should be mentioned here is that Bashar al-Assad has assumed power after preparation by the military and security institutions, after the death of his father, when the article of age in the Constitution was amended in a moment in order to match al-Assad’s age. Only because of the sectarian structure of that institutions, such preparation would have not been made, and with such sarcasm that the whole world watched.
The other side which is worth mentioning is that Annan’s Plan does not differ from the proposal of Zionist Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who announced it during his visit to the U.S. some weeks ago, and was adopted, paradoxically, by U.S. President Obama under the so-called “Yemeni model”. This means that the Israeli concern has a strong presence in this regard, which says that the military and security institutions (Barak mentioned in particular the military intelligence) are a means of stability in the Syrian front. Instead of a mass militarization of the revolution that may expose the arena to Jihadist penetrations, that would later be hard to be controlled, let alone not guaranteeing the agendas of the parties assuming the power next.
The main question that should be put here seems about the position of Bashar on this plan, and the Iranian position before him. But more important question is about the position of the fragmented opposition forces, that included military groups that are neither supported by the National Council nor someone else. Most important than this is the position of the Syrian people, and to what extent they may accept a plan that keeps the military and security institutions, that are heavily bloodstained in a horrible way, along decades and not only since the outbreak of the revolution.
We do not have final answers, despite that out talk indicates our rejection of the plan and then move on the revolutionary escalation until we completely overthrow the regime and build new Syria. In general, we will have to wait for more details and positions, including positions of the figures of revolution, and maybe Turkey and some influential Arab states, in order to know the fate of the plan in case it is agreed upon in the next days.