With each passing day since the declaration of the preliminary results of the first round of the Egyptian Presidential elections, the magnitude of the political deadlock that the revolution finds itself in becomes more clear. The forces that triggered the revolution are the present absentees in these elections. They are the force that can give the preponderance for any of the contesting candidates in the runoff, and at the same time they can affect the fate of Egypt if they took a passive attitude, where it will not be known who of the candidates is most likely to win.
Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, became in an overnight, in equal chances with the candidate of the former regime and the Military Council, lieutenant General Ahmed Shafiq, whether because of the close level of votes they obtained in the first round, or because both of them are equally bitter options to the other forces and most of the Egyptian people.
With the exception of the grass roots of the Muslim Brotherhood and the remainder of the National party and its security body which are firmly intact, the other revolutionary forces have to determine their options. They have no alternatives other than being neutral or to make an understanding with the Muslim Brotherhood over a clear commitment on a political agenda, in return to siding with Mohammed Morsi, to block the way in the face of Shafiq to be President of Egypt.
No doubt that Shafiq is the ideal candidate of the Military Council and the remainders of the National Party, and had it not been to the support of these parties, Shafiq wouldn't have won all these votes that enabled him for the runoff. This of course is not a defame to the impartiality of the elections but it questions the neutrality of the Military Council, which advised the nomination of Shafiq though he falls under the provisions of the political isolation law.
On the other hand any of the revolutionary forces as represented by Morsi, Sobahi or Abo al-Fotoh wouldn't have sent reassurance to the Military Council which proved efficiency and cunningness in management of the transitional period that continued for a year and three months, and it still, believes in the worthiness of the military for ruling a large country like Egypt, in terms that one of the members of the military institution takes off the military uniform and puts on a civilian one in undertaking presidency. It is probably that the Military Council is not alone in this vision, which it shares with some Arab countries and Israel, and is partly supported by USA, and the EU.
In light of these calculations Lieutenant General Shafiq if he wins, won't find other than the staff of the former President Hosni Mubarak for running the country, which means the breakout of a new revolution, and therefore the options will be more dire in case of breakout of such revolution.
The political stability at its best, will not happen in light of the Brotherhood dominance on the Parliament and the Shora Council, which may force Shafiq who would have no option other than dissolving the two councils, in an attempt to control the effect of the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary forces on the Egyptian political life.
Though he tried since the announcement of the preliminary results that qualified him for the runoff, to strike deals with the political forces, which have all turned down his attempts. He also tried to make bargains with the youth revolutionaries, by saying that he would recover their stolen revolution. It is a bargain that is rejected by the 6 April movement and the other Egyptian youth revolutionaries. They stressed their determination to prevent him from obtaining presidency.
Despite all the fears of the prospects of the winning of the Brotherhood candidate, Morsi, to the presidency, however the political forces which voted for Sobahi or Abo al-Fotoh will be the preponderance force. They will be closer to conformity with Morsi and his groups, in return for guarantees, which seem probable to be crystallized, because these blocs will not prefer the option of agreement with Shafiq or to vote for him.
That is why a political agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood on a clear program will be inevitable. It stipulates obligatory concessions by the Brotherhood, which makes them correct their political mistakes which they had committed during the previous months. They are mistakes in the political performance that can be corrected, and not of authority practice that had not yet been tasted by the Brotherhood or the other political forces.
I believe that the mature political forces that are concerned by the success of the Brotherhood , know that their overthrow later on, is easier and not complicated as it was the case with Mobark's, in addition to the awareness of the Brotherhood to the requirements of the ruling.
For instance, their initiative in the formation of the parliamentary and political delegation which went to Saudi Arabia, to resolve the convicted al-Jizawi issue, and to convince Saudi Arabia to return their ambassador to Cairo, gives a positive indication, of their flexibility in undertaking the foreign political affairs.
However fears will remain, regarding the dealings of the Brotherhood with the social, cultural and economic issues. Egypt is the biggest and most important enlightenment country, and the source of culture and arts, where the attitude of the Brotherhood movement towards these issue will determine their political future.