The Arab spring has taken the Islamists to the doorsteps of parliaments, however it had at the same time directed two fatal stabs to their ideology. This is because the call for an Islamic nation run into the internal aspirations of the countries for the recovery of their identity and names as they used to be after the period that followed their independence. They are not heading towards integration into in a huge Islamic entity, but they have the tendency to shake off dust from their distinctive national face. These are clearly alienated from the issues that mix the people like pieces of potatoes, in whose name the national policies and their affairs had been delayed for decades. 

The triumphed political Islam, is not necessarily a call for an Islamic nation and it is not the famous slogan of Hassan al-Bana "Islam is our constitution," at a time when there is a big demand for national constitutions. Even the triumphed Islam, if the expression is right is the carrier of the local suffering, where those who adopt it call for freedom, honor and bread. It is a suffering that many conditions including the absence of policies had stipulated the modification of expressing its itself, by making religion one of its forms.

The second stab is represented by what our countries and time demand as realized in little forms of central political, and institutional reordering.

They want forms that pay more attention to the national, ethnic, religious, sectarian and regional disparity in these countries.

And after all that happens it represents it also represents a condition for the continuation of these existing units.

If the discovery of the homelands is half of the fact, the organization of these homelands forms its other complementary half.

This is because the intrinsic call for centralization by the Islamists, like any other across boarder ideologies, is refused nowadays in Iraq and Libya either directly or indirectly.  
Instead of the previous hollow seeking of huge fusion, the discovery of reality requires the arrangement of the current national unities which are themselves difficult tasks and those who fail in them cannot succeed in topics that are bigger than them.

The Islamists could learn a lesson from the nationalistic experience, regarding the nature of the state and the power emerging from it.

The history of the tendency towards firm central grip, starting from King Ghazi, its culmination by Jamal Abdul-Nasser, and its disintegration on the hands of Sadam Hussein the two Assads and Gadafi, could be not released from the construction of a strong army and oppressive security apparatus under the excuse of fighting the crucial enemy, as represented by America, Europe and Israel.

It is not a coincidence that the nationalistic regimes are the  most and hostile even at the theoretical level, were themselves the most repressive in the modern orderly ideology of the word.
In short we are not before two options; one concerning the fundamental attitude from the enemy and centralization, army and security that emerges from it, and another which practices autocracy and confiscates politics so that no voice rises above that of the battle. 
On the contrary we are before one issue in terms of getting rid of tyranny and to retreat from the opposing position to the world.
Can the Islamist even for once recognize reality as it is without the intrigue theory of devils, Jews and Masonic.
This is the question which surpasses the Islamists to the forces and symbols whose joint and consecutive efforts have led to the establishment of the "Arabic political thought" in its broader sense.